Landslide on Gardesana Occidentale: Experts Cite Predictable Risks and Failures
The landslide that occurred on February 3, 1999, on the Gardesana Occidentale was not a “fortuitous event,” but a “predictable incident.” This is the conclusion reached by the extensive report drafted over these months by engineer Enrico Manfrini of Rovereto and geologist Luigi Frassinella of Trento, at the request of Deputy Prosecutor Fabio Biasi. They are investigating to shed light on the tragic landslide that claimed the life of Trentino retiree Gino Avancini between Limone and Riva.
It should be recalled that the criminal hypotheses considered in the Rovereto prosecutor’s files range from involuntary manslaughter to negligent omission of safety measures or defenses against disasters or work-related injuries, as well as the willful removal or omission of safety measures to prevent workplace injuries.
Results of the Geomechanical Expert Report
“The geological study of the rock mass at and near the detachment niche of February 3, 1999 —” write Manfrini and Frassinella —”— allowed identification of additional conditions prone to the release of rock elements with highly variable volumes. The investigation methodology adopted —” add the two engineers —”— does not require technical skills beyond standard geological expertise, nor physical capacities above the norm… The absence of a comprehensive geological study on the subject is not due to technical delays but rather to the lack of a decision to carry it out.”
It is therefore believed that it was possible to locate, using standard operational methods, areas at imminent risk of rockfalls, and that such work should have been completed in time to prevent the event of February 3.” The conclusions of the report are expected to spark further controversy regarding the tragedy.
Criticisms of the Responsibilities of the Province and Infrastructures
We should clarify immediately that, according to the two experts, the Autonomous Province of Trento, which seven months prior to the landslide took responsibility for maintaining the Trentino section of Gardesana, did not have “sufficient technical time for a comprehensive study of the overlying slope, hampered by delays and shortcomings of the ANAS.” One of these shortcomings concerned the absence of a geologist prescribed in the staffing plan of ANAS for the area in question, who was stationed in Puglia.
In November ’96, the Trentino Alto Adige Department of Roads wrote to Bari to request the availability of the geologist for “short limited periods,” but Bari responded negatively citing “distance and workload reasons.”
A second deficiency highlighted by the experts relates to the monitoring sensors installed on the slope. These, installed on an experimental basis, triggered “numerous false alarms,” which led technicians to remove the warning semaphore activated during danger periods. These sensors and their electrical transmission cables were never reinstalled after being stolen in November ’97.
The experts conclude by stating that the methodologies needed to predict a landslide “have been known for decades.” However, they were not applied on Gardesana.